"What's Past is Prologue" Ramblings about History

Hi Everyone. So I'm working on a pretty big post at the moment, so my work in progress post about the Civil War will have to wait. In the meantime I'm posting an essay I wrote recently for my history colloquium. Enjoy!

In 1757, tired of the neglect and ill-treatment he had received, an overworked George Washington angrily informed the Royal Governor of Virginia that he could not fathom, “that being Americans should deprive us of the benefits of British subjects.”[1] The words reflected a hard maturation on the Western frontier. Gone was the Washington who had claimed to hear music from the shots of muskets. In its place, was a hardened and disillusioned commander, who was starting to doubt whether he was really a full member of the British Empire that he was fighting to protect. In contrast to provincial forces in other colonies, however, the massive refugee crisis on the isolated Virginia frontier forced Washington to both confront British prejudices and insults while training his men to become redcoats in everything but name. As a result, while tensions increased between the Virginia Regiment and the British command, Washington was absorbing the tactics and discipline that he would one day employ to defeat the British in the American Revolution.

When the fighting broke out in the dense forests of the Ohio River Valley, the British government called upon the colonists to raise provincial forces to defend their frontiers. In the Northern colonies, these forces served mostly as support troops. These soldiers were typically second sons in New England’s farming communities who were without a plot of land to work.[2] Usually, these forces signed on for short, set enlistments.[3] Stubborn, proud, and independent, these were regiments whose commanders lead their men to desert if their enlistment contracts were breached, and who would infuriate the British command due to their perceived arrogance and insubordination.[4] In that sense, they were not terribly different from the numerous Native American tribes employed by the French, who were also derided as being ungovernable and troublesome.[5] Indeed, the natives and provincials both found fault with British discipline and tactics. One native told a missionary, “The English people are fools; they hold their guns half a man high, and then let them snap: we take sight and have them at a shot…we take care to have the first shot at our enemies.”[6] A New Englander at the Battle of Ticonderoga echoed the natives incredulousness, “Col. Preble… swore he would knock the first man down who should step out of his ranks which greatly surprised me, to think, that I must stand still to be shot at.”[7] Theirs was a world that had no place for the strict discipline of the regular troops. They fought in support of the British army, but they would not have considered themselves part of it.

By contrast, for much of its existence, the Virginia regiment had no British army to fight with. After the disastrous end to the Braddock campaign, Washington, the newly named commander of the Virginia forces along the frontier was forced to defend hundreds of miles of wilderness with only his own provincial forces. Essentially, he was a “forgotten man on a forgotten front.”[8] In contrast to the forces in New England, his recruits were to face the enemy alone, and he would forsake the lax discipline standards common in the regiments farther North.[9] The situation demanded it.

The British defeat at the Battle of the Monongahela had set off a massive refugee crisis. Indian forces, alienated by Braddock’s dismissive manner and paid by the French government, began raiding and attacking British settlements.[10] A contemporary account at the time claimed that, at certain points, the frontier had been rolled back over 150 miles.[11] As noted by Peter Silver, this rollback of the frontier brought settlers back east in numbers previously thought unfathomable.[12] So great was the terror that families fled the frontier without bothering to pack or store their food, in the years to come soldiers patrolling the frontier were often able to feed themselves off of the crops left behind by the refugees.[13]Along the Pennsylvania-Virginia frontier, local officials were overwhelmed by the number of humans and animals suddenly arriving.[14] As noted by Ben Franklin, many places were “fill’d with Refugees, the Workmen’s Shops, and even the Cellars being crouded with Women and Children.”[15] With the British having turned their focus towards the French forts on the New York-Canada border, the provincial authorities were left to deal with one of the worst refugee crises in colonial history entirely on their own.

In Virginia, much of the burden of handling this challenge fell on Washington’s shoulders. Writing to Governor Dinwiddie, he noted both the terror of the inhabitants, and his own regiment’s helplessness to prevent further Indian attacks.[16] Such sentiments were to become a common feature of Washington’s writings throughout the war, as he constantly struggled to both keep his men at fighting strength and provide them with supplies. In 1755, he would inform the governor that delays had caused the loss of the hogs requisitioned for the army.[17] His was an impossible job, as Franklin noted, “People are sometimes calp’d between Fort and Fort, and very near the Forts…the land must be till’d and business follow’d; every House and Plantation cannot be guarded.”[18] Even if, “every man in the Country was a Veteran Soldier,” Franklin opined, the frontier would still not be safe.[19] For Washington, it was made worse by the fact that his recruits were anything but veteran soldiers, and he would need to do everything in his power to just to ensure that there was even a force available to protect the frontier.

Part of the problem lay in recruitment. While the Northern colonies were able to lure in members of the middling class through the use of generous bounties, the compensation organized by the House of Burgesses was so small that very few people were enticed to join up.[20] The legislature, concerned both with a potential slave revolt and the loss of agricultural output, was hesitant to call up large numbers of men.[21] A later conscription law brought in greater numbers of recruits, but also meant that Washington was defending the frontier with the homeless and the poor.[22] The only major benefit of joining up in the early years of the regiment was that soldiers were relived of debts.[23] Desertions were high. It is estimated that over a quarter of the recruits deserted before they even reached the frontier.[24] Displaced frontier farmers, whose livelihoods depended on being able to return to their homes, were Washington, ruefully reported, “choosing as they say to die with their Wives and Family’s.”[25] In addition, while Washington informed his commanders that “[n]ever were the Indians more wanted than at this time,” the native tribes did not feel the same way, and, with some exceptions towards the end of war, failed to join up.[26] Thus his efforts to recruit native troops fell flat. As such, it is hardly surprising that Washington was unable to raise even half of the 1.500 men authorized to protect the frontier.[27] It would not be until several years later, that the Virginia legislature, flush with money from the Pitt Government, raised the salary and bounties for the troops.[28] When this happened, the quota was filled within several weeks.[29] While others might have resigned, Washington, in his own words, motivated to serve “his Majestys Service” remained with the task before him.[30]

In the early months after the war, Washington informed the governor “no orders are obey’d but what a Party of Soldier’s or my own drawn Sword enforces.”^{^[31]} Discipline was a serious problem, and Washington begged Dinwiddie to provide better regulations for the soldiers.^{^[32]} To ensure that the men he recruited stayed on to fight; Washington took a page from his British counterparts and instituted a tough system of drill and discipline for his Virginians. While colonial commanders in Massachusetts shuddered at the thought of the seemingly draconian measures employed by the British army, Washington was all too happy to boast of the 40 foot tall Gallows he’d constructed to hang deserters.[33] Nor was he unwilling to court-martial both soldiers who failed to keep their guns in proper working condition and the officers responsible for them.[34] There is some evidence that Washington was somewhat more lenient than his regular army counterparts. He knew most of his men personally, and was willing to intercede if he felt the situation warranted it.[35] Writing to the governor, he asked that one soldier be pardoned because, he “was among the first of my followers: and always behaved himself with great sobriety, honesty and diligence.”[36] The other person mentioned in the letter however, was “a most atrocious villain, and richly merits an ignominious Death.”[37] To the colonial commanders in the Northern colonies, such actions would have been seen as British at best and barbaric at worst. As New England officers were of the same social standing as their men, and often came from the same towns as they did, a court-martial of any of the soldiers who were serving under them would have been a quick way to lose both their respect and the respect of their friends and neighbors back home.[38] Such concerns did not affect Washington, a minor tidewater aristocrat, but his actions also reflect that his was an army serving a very different role from his brethren in New England.

In a report to the Governor, Washington noted that provincial troops in other colonies were “raized for a Season-assembled in the Spring and dismissed in the Fall” while he and his men “have done as regular Duty for upwards of three Years as any regiment in His Majesty’s Service.”[39] While Washington might have been a stern taskmaster, it was all for the goal of turning his men into soldiers who could perform the same role as a British redcoat. While some New Englander’s did admire the precision of the British forces, a lack of necessity combined with the constant assignment of auxiliary jobs meant that they never received the drills necessary to match that standard.[40] In addition, the short length of service meant that they often lacked the training necessary to fight. One New England regiment, for example had only eight days of drilling before it participated in the assault on Fort Ticonderoga.[41] In fact, New England troops were more likely to take pride in their differences from the soldiers of the Mother Country, while Washington delighted in the ways that his colonials matched up or even exceeded the regulars, noting that his men performed the same roles yet, “enjoy not one benefit which regulars do.”[42] In his mind, it would appear, he had made his troops into British soldiers.

While it might seem surprising that Washington’s conscripts, vagabonds, and debtors could ever match up to the British army, in many ways Washington and his forces did bear more similarities to the British then to their fellow provincial forces. Like Washington, most of the British officers would have been aristocrats, while their men tended to be drawn from the lowest rungs of society.[43] Enlistments were for long periods of time, and discipline was strict in both armies.[44] Strict discipline turned the seemingly ungovernable poor in England into the fighting force marveled at by the New Englanders, and overtime it appears that it did the same for Washington’s troops. In fact, the Virginia regiment, at least in Washington’s mind, was in many ways a superior fighting force. Writing about Braddock’s defeat, Washington opined that, “The Virginians behavd like Men, and died like Soldier’s” while “the dastardly behavior of the English Soldier’s exposed all those who were incilin’d to do their duty, to almost certain Death.”[45] While British prejudice prevented high command from seeing Washington’s men as anything more as irregulars, Washington’s training and soldiers would eventually prove to be invaluable to the effort to reclaim the frontier.

Thus, alone on the frontier, Washington and his forces served as stand-ins for the British army. Their size was never enough to push back the French, but Washington was able to boast of small victories, such as when his forces ambushed a French raiding party and killed its commander.[46] In addition, the forts and blockhouses erected and guarded by his men provided a place for settlers to flee.[47] This, to some extent, helped decrease the depopulation of the frontier.[48] To have driven off the French completely was out of the question. By his own estimates, a successful offensive campaign to crush the enemy would have required at least 2,000 men, and at no point did Washington ever have half of that.[49] It would ultimately take a combined colonial and regular force, wearing the uniforms designed by Washington and employing the forest-fighting tactics he developed on the frontier, to finally conquer Fort Duquesne, and end the violence.[50] When peace returned to the Virginia frontier, Washington resigned his commission. At this time, he and his men had surpassed their New England counterparts in both military skills and battle experience. The men marched like regulars and fought like regulars (with some modifications to accommodate frontier fighting). It is that training that helped ensure that a force remained on the frontier until Fort Duquesne was taken. However, despite their level of professionalism, Washington and his soldiers, like their New England counterparts, felt only resentment towards the British command and buerracracy.

As he addressed the regiment for the last time, Washington, while thanking the troops for their service, also let slip a hint of anger. He informed the soldiers that “Your Address is in the hands of the Governor, and will be presented by him to the Council. I hope (but cannot ascertain it) that matter may be settled agreeable to your wishes.”[51] This was the only mention of the British government, there was no praise towards the king, but rather only a concern that his majesty’s representative in Virginia might not serve the best interests of the regiment. While not as bold as Washington’s earlier letter to Dinwiddie, the letter nevertheless demonstrates how the war had altered Washington’s opinion of the government. In this aspect, he was not so different from the provincial forces of New England.

While the French and Indian War was a major victory for the British Empire, it was also a litmus test for just how well the British and colonials could work together, with the end result being significant tension between the two groups. New Englanders were shocked both by British organization and by British behavior. Swearing among regulars as well as the presence of camp prostitutes shocked the soldiers of Puritan-founded Massachusetts.[52] Fights between regulars and colonials were common, with the colonials employing the epithet of Lobster to verbally abuse their counterparts.[53] As one British soldier ruefully noted, the fighting became so bad that the command was forced to make name calling a punishable crime.[54] For the British, the colonials were lazy and near useless as fighters.[55] As Commander Jeffrey Amherst wrote, “The Disregard of Orders, and Studying of their own Ease, rather than the good of the Service, has been to often Just Grounds for Complaint Against Some of the Provincial Officers, and all their men.”[56] These sentiments were reflected in the way the regulars interacted with their men, one New Englander noted that, of all the conversations he had had with the British, only one of them had provided a nice conversation.[57] Such mutual loathing strained the relationship between the two forces, who were supposed to be on the same side.

The end result of these disagreements was that New Englanders began to take significant pride in their differences with the British crown. While the British might believe that a a soldier was defined by obedience, for the New Englanders, a redcoat could never be truly great because, due to their swearing and promiscuity, they were fundamentally bad people.[58] Fred Anderson argues that this notion of moral superiority allowed the New Englander’s to overestimate their contribution to the war, which is supported by statements made both during and after the conflict.[59] A New England minister, exhorting the fall of Quebec, spoke of the colonies, becoming “a mighty empire (I do not mean an independent one) in numbers little inferior to the greatest in Europe and felicity to none.”[60] Aside from the quick clarification, the minister presents an image of the colonists expanding west with minimal to no help from the Mother country. With a working relationship that at several points devolved to colonists and regulars firing at each other, it is hardly surprising that the tensions would reach a point where both sides would swear that they do not need the other.[61] For his part, Washington, no doubt, would have sympathized with the provincial’s complaints of being left out of war councils and not being consulted about military matters.[62] However, his difficulties with the British also encompassed prejudice that had significant bearings on his professional career.

In the Southern theatre, relations between provincials and regulars were also strained. Writing in the aftermath of the Braddock campaign, Washington’s second in command, Adam Stephen blasted the British commander for his stupidity and arrogance.[63] That the Redcoats had fired upon the provincials during the heat of battle certainly would have aggravated matters further.[64] Washington, by contrast, who had ridden next to Braddock during the battle, did not criticize the general, and, in fact, thought that many of the criticisms leveled against him were unfair.[65] For most of the war, however, Washington was alone on the frontier, and thus these interactions with the British were mostly via post. But while he retained a high opinion of Braddock, he soon realized that being an American did in fact stop from being a full British subject.

From a young age Washington had longed to be a part of the British military system, and upon taking command of the Virginia regiment, he continued to petition for a full military commission. As he wrote to Dinwiddie, he and the Virginia regiment “want nothing but Commissions from His Majesty to make us as regular a Corps on this Continent.”[66] Later on he petitioned Lord Louden for integration into the regular establishment.[67] The General denied this, and, to add insult to injury, gave an English colonel full authority over Washington.[68] Washington’s first order from his new commander was to provide him with “a hundred barrels of gunpowder twelve thousand flints, and three tons of lead.”[69] Washington was already providing for his own troops with minimal help from England, and with that order, it would have seemed that he now had to supply the British regulars as well.

For an ambitious young officer such as Washington, such actions would have been nothing short of infuriating. As he saw it, “[w]e are Defending the Kings Dominions… and there can be no Sufficient reason given why we, who spend our blood and Treasure in Defence of the Country are not entitled to equal prefermt.”[70] Furthermore, “there is, as equitable a right ot expect something for three years hard and bloody Service, as for 10 spent at St. James’s &ca where real Service, or a field of Battle never was seen.”[71] In Washington’s Virginia Regiment, men were promoted based on skill, and, so strong was his belief in in promotions based on merit, that he resisted efforts by his friend and mentor Lord Fairfax to have unqualified men with good connections become officers.[72] His experience in dealing with men like Lord Loundon, who according to one historian, “would have been hard-pressed to distinguish the Alleghenies from the Alps” no doubt would have convinced him of the superiority of his merit-based system of promotion.[73]The hard truth, however, was that no matter his service, he, at least in the eyes of the British government, would never be the equal to the redcoats he served alongside. While the New England troops dealt with open insults, for Washington, the insults came in the form of numerous denied promotions due to his colonial birth.

Despite, the prejudices and restrictions Washington faced, there is no evidence that he considered turning traitor while he was in the employment of the British army. With that said, his writings clearly demonstrate a man who was fed up and distrustful of the British military establishment. In the years leading up the Forbes expedition, he was bombarded with numerous proposals to take back Fort Duquesne which demonstrated British lack of understanding regarding both the North American continent and the war itself.[74] After reading one such proposal, he wondered whether the individual responsible for the plan intended to provide the troops with wings, as flying to Fort Duquesne was the only way to accomplish the mission in the time frame given.[75] Such feelings were felt by many throughout the colonies who had worked with the crown during the war. Ben Franklin, looking back from the year 1784, noted the French and Indian War “gave us Americans the first Suspicion that our exalted Ideas of the Prowess of the British Regulars had not been well founded.” Events like Braddock’s defeat had demonstrated the fallibility and hubris of both the British government and military, as well as their demeaning view of the colonials.

For, some, particularly those in the New England colonies, British failures confirmed their views of the superiority of colonists. For Washington, while British policy was infuriating, British tactics and discipline were useful tools to learn. Indeed, the skills Washington learned on the Virginia Frontier would become very useful when he was commanding the Continental Army. The experience of trying to command an ill-disciplined, poorly supplied, and disorganized force effectively foreshadowed his next command barely twenty years later. In addition, like many British officers, Washington, by the end of the war, became well aware of the deficiencies of a militia. During the revolution, while men like Jefferson extolled the virtues of the patriotic farms taking up arms to defend their homes, Washington, no doubt, remembered how on one occasion, a militia unit, hearing that the French were nearby, approached Washington, told him that they their enlistments were up and went home.^{^[76]} In fact, his opinions regarding the militia more closely resembled those of his regular counterparts. Writing to Coronel Stanwix, he informed him that, “militia, you will find, Sir, will never answer your expectations-No dependendance is to be placed upon them.”^{^[77]} His frustration that he needed to pay a militia unit thirty pounds of tobacco for every day of service constructing a fort echoes the incredulousness of General Amherst and others when it came to paying colonial wages.[78] The need for a professional disciplined force, while ignored by many other founding fathers, would drive Washington’s focus during the revolution, and ensure that the colonies, would have strong, trained army to fight for Independence.

From a British perspective, the war allowed them to essentially create the force that would one day tear apart their North American empire. During the conflict, British and colonial forces collaborated on a scale never before seen, with colonial officers getting to serve with and learn from experienced British officers. Troops from different colonies met and intermingled during the course of campaigns, and representatives from the various governments met and discussed various issues. At the same time, the prejudices of the British military alienated many provincial soldiers, many of whom would use the skills they learned in the war to help free themselves from the British empire forever. It was a paradox that would haunt the British Empire even as it grew to include a quarter of the world’s population. There was much to gain from adopting British organization and ideas, but the attitudes of the empire’s representative meant that although colonies wished to adopt British ideas, they did not want to remain under Crown control. For Washington, at least, the British taught him valuable lessons while also laying the seeds for the events that would one day result in him using those lessons against them.

Bibliography

Anderson, Fred. A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984.

Anderson, Fred. Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1763. New York: Vintage Books, 2001.

Bougainville, Louis Antoine de. Adventure in the Wilderness. Translated and Edited by Edward P. Hamilton. Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1964.

Ellis, Joseph. His Excellency. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.

Christian Frederick Post, “Delaware Indians Explain How They Fight,”The Seven Years' War in North America: A Brief History with Documents, edited by Timothy Shannon. Boston: Bedford /St. Martin's, 2014.

Silver, Peter. Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America. New York: Norton, 2008.

Titus, James. Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991.

Washington, George. Writings. Edited by John Rhodehamel. New York: Penguin, 1997.

[1] George Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: March 10th 1757” in Writings, ed. John Rhodehamel (New York: Penguin, 1997), 86.

[2] Fred Anderson, A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and Society in the Seven Years War, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984), 36.

[3] Anderson, A People’s Army, 36.

[4] Anderson, A People’s Army, 192-193, 252.

Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1763 (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 372.

[5] Louis Antoine de Bougainville, Adventure in the Wilderness, trans. and ed. Edward P. Hamilton (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 154.

[6] Christian Frederick Post, “Delaware Indians Explain How They Fight,” in Timothy J. Shannon, The Seven Years' War in North America: A Brief History with Documents (Boston: Bedford /St. Martin's, 2014), 75.

[7] Shannon, The Seven Years’ War, 84.

[8] Joseph Ellis, His Excellency, (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 24.

[9] Anderson, Crucible of War, 159.

[10] Shannon, The Seven Years’ War, 64-65.

[11] James Titus Old Dominion at War: Society, Politics, and Warfare in Late Colonial Virginia (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1991), 74.

[12] Peter Silver, Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America, (New York: Norton, 2008), 70.

[13] Titus, Old Dominion at War, 74.

[14] Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 70.

[15] Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 71.

[16] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: October 11th 1755,” in Writings, 63.

[17] Washington, “Letter to to Robert Dinwiddie: December 5th 1755.” in Writings, 69.

[18] Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 43.

[19] Silver, Our Savage Neighbors, 43.

[20] Anderson, Crucible of War, 159.

[21] Titus, Old Dominion at War, 76.

[22] Anderson, Crucible of War, 159.

[23] Titus, Old Dominion at War, 90.

[24] Titus, Old Dominion at War, 104.

[25] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: October 11th 1755,” in Writings, 63.

[26] Washington, “Letter to Christopher Gist: October 10th 1755,” in Writings, 62.

[27] Anderson, Crucible of War, 64.

[28] Anderson, Crucible of War, 230.

[29] Anderson, Crucible of War, 230.

[30] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: October 11th 1755, “ in Writings, 64.

[31] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: October 11th 1755,” in Writings, 63.

[32] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: October 11th 1755,” in Writings, 64.

[33] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: October 11th 1755,” in Writings, 90.

[34] Washington, “General Orders: Friday May 21st 1756,” in Writings, 77.

[35] Ellis, His Excellency, 27.

[36] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: May 23rd, 1756,” in Writings, 78.

[37] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: May 23rd, 1756,” in Writings, 78.

[38] Anderson, A People’s Army, 27.

[39] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: March 10th, 1757,” in Writings, 87.

[40] Anderson, A People’s Army, 116.

[41] Anderson, A People’s Army, 75.

[42] Anderson, A People’s Army, 141, 27.

Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: March 10th, 1757,” in Writings, 87.

[43] Anderson, A People’s Army, 27.

Anderson, Crucible of War, 159.

[44] Anderson, A People’s Army, 121.

Anderson, Crucible of War, 159.

[45] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: July 18th, 1755,” in Writings, 58.

[46] Washington, “Letter to Robert Hunter Morris: April 9th, 1756,” in Writings, 71-72.

[47] Titus, Old Dominion at War, 102.

[48] Titus, Old Dominion at War, 102.

[49] Titus, Old Dominion at War, 94.

[50] Ellis, His Excellency, 32.

[51] Washington, “Farewell Address to the Virginia Regiment,” in Writings, 99.

[52] Anderson, A People’s Army, 118.

[53] Anderson, A People’s Army, 119.

[54] Anderson, A People’s Army, 121.

[55] Anderson, Crucible of War, 371.

[56] Anderson, Crucible of War, 372.

[57] Anderson, A People’s Army, 115.

[58] Anderson, A People’s Army, 141.

[59] Anderson, A People’s Army, 141.

[60] Shannon, The Seven Years’ War, 151.

[61] Anderson, A People’s Army, 120.

[62] Anderson, A People’s Army, 114.

[63] Anderson, Crucible of War, 103.

[64] Anderson, Crucible of War, 102.

[65] Anderson, Crucible of War, 106.

[66] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: March 10th 1757,” in Writings, 87.

[67] Anderson, Crucible of War, 203.

[68] Anderson, Crucible of War, 203.

[69] Anderson, Crucible of War, 203.

[70] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: March 10th 1757,” in Writings, 86.

[71] Washington, “Letter to Robert Dinwiddie: March 10th 1757,” in Writings, 86.

[72] Ellis, His Excellency, 30.

[73] Ellis, His Excellency, 30.

[74] Ellis, His Excellency, 31.

[75] Ellis, His Excellency, 31.

[76] Ellis, His Excellency 29.

[77] Washington, “Letter to John Stanwix: July 15th 1757,” in Writings, 90.

[78] Ellis, His Excellency 29.

"What's Past is Prologue" Ramblings about History

Thursday, August 14, 2014

Small Delays: Big Consequences

Monday, August 4, 2014

On His Majesty’s Provincial Forces: A Comparison between the Wartime Experiences of the Virginia Regiment and the New England Provincial Forces during the French and Indian War

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